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Abstract
An initial Collision Avoidance for Airport
Traffic (CAAT) concept for the Terminal
Maneuvering Area (TMA) was evaluated in a
simulation study at the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Langley Research
Center. CAAT is being designed to enhance
surface situation awareness and provide cockpit
alerts of potential conflicts during runway, taxi, and
low altitude air-to-air operations. The purpose of
the study was to evaluate the initial concept for an
aircraft-based method of conflict detection and
resolution (CD&R) in the TMA focusing on
conflict detection algorithms and alerting display
concepts. This paper gives an overview of the
CD&R concept, simulation study, and test results.
Introduction
The Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) concept for the year 2025 and
beyond envisions the movement of large numbers
of people and goods in a safe, efficient, and reliable
manner [1]. NextGen will remove many of the
constraints in the current air transportation system,
support a wider range of operations, and deliver an
overall system capacity up to three times that of
current operating levels. Emerging NextGen
operational concepts [2], such as four-dimensional
trajectory (4DT) – based airborne and surface
operations, equivalent visual operations, and super
density arrival and departure operations, represent a
different approach to air traffic management and as
a result, a dramatic shift in the tasks, roles, and
responsibilities for the flight deck and Air Traffic
control (ATC) to ensure a safe, sustainable air
transportation system.
NASA has initiated a Collision Avoidance for
Airport Traffic (CAAT) research topic to develop
technologies, data, and guidelines to enable conflict
detection and resolution (CD&R) in the Terminal
Maneuvering Area (TMA) under current and
emerging NextGen operating concepts. The goal of
CAAT is to provide an additional, protective safety
layer of CD&R for NextGen TMA operations.
CAAT builds on substantial NASA research and
testing for surface operations situation awareness
and runway incursion conflict detection and alerting
(i.e., the Runway Incursion Prevention System) [3,
4, 5, 6]. The concepts use cockpit display designs
to promote surface situation awareness, tailored for
NextGen operations, and associated CD&R
concepts for safety assurance. The concepts
employ continual own-ship and traffic data
monitoring and algorithms to detect conflicts on the
runway, at low altitudes near the airport, and during
taxi and ramp operations for multiple classes of
aircraft and surface vehicles. Alerts designed for
flight crew awareness identify potentially hazardous
operational conditions that may require immediate
flight crew response.
NASA is also investigating the concept of
providing enhanced situation relevant information
for potential runway safety hazards. These
indications are intended to increase the flight crews’
situation awareness of traffic that could affect
runway safety. Research is being initiated
regarding the feasibility of providing resolution
advisories for conflicts in the TMA to effectively
resolve conflict situations without producing
undesired consequences.
A piloted simulation study was conducted to
investigate the utility of initial concepts for aircraft-
based CD&R in the TMA. This paper will present
an overview of the CD&R concept, simulation
study, and test results.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090040474 2019-08-30T08:13:32+00:00Z
System Description
Simulation Facility
Flight Deck Simulator
This research was conducted in the Research
Flight Deck (RFD) simulator at NASA Langley
Research Center (Figure 1). The simulated aircraft
dynamics model was a medium to long-haul
commercial passenger aircraft. The RFD
configuration is a fixed-based, dual-pilot simulator
with a collimated 200° panoramic out-the-window
scene. Operations were conducted at the Chicago
O’Hare International (ORD) airport. The out-the-
window scene included realistic taxiways and
runways with appropriate markings, airport
lighting, and other aircraft in various simulated
weather/lighting conditions. The visual acuity of the
out-the-window scene was 20/40 (pixels per
degree). The RFD was equipped with a 30°
horizontal x 24° vertical field-of-view stroke-on-
raster head-up display located on the left or
captain’s side.
As shown in Figure 1, the simulator had four
large main instrument panel displays referred to as:
(left to right) Pilot’s Primary Flight Display (PFD),
Pilot’s Navigation Display (ND), Co-pilot’s ND,
and Co-pilot’s PFD. The four display panels were
Liquid Crystal Displays with 13.25” x 10.5”
viewable space at 1280 x 1024 resolution. Each
display used independent brightness control and had
very high readability, contrast ratio and viewing
angle specifications resulting in excellent cross
cockpit readability. The RFD included a Mode
Control Panel, Flight Management System, Control
Display Units, and hydraulic side-stick control
inceptors.
Figure 1. RFD Flight Deck
Two Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) were
installed. Each provided a display resolution of
1024 x 768 with a 10.4” diagonal touch screen
display. The EFBs were mounted above and
outboard of the side-stick control inceptors near the
side window sill. The EFBs utilized a dynamic
menu interface using the line select buttons or
touch-screen operation. Custom software was
developed to provide desired experimental
functionality, including Controller Pilot Data-link
Communications (CPDLC), airport maps and
charts. The airport map page and charts pages
displayed standard Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) diagrams that enabled the pilots to zoom and
pan utilizing available buttons on the interface.
Traffic position data was “broadcast” at a 1 Hz
rate. No additional latency in traffic position was
used. Own-ship position data was updated at a 50
Hz rate. Positional error was not introduced into
these data. An ATC environment was simulated
using data-link messages for own-ship instructions.
The ATC messages were triggered based on
specific events and timings to coincide with the task
scenario. Auditory ATC communications were not
used for this study; therefore, instructions for other
traffic were not available to the Evaluation Pilots
(EPs).
Flight Deck Displays
The PFD, ND, and Engine Indication and
Crew Alerting System display (EICAS) were
modeled after Boeing 787, Gulfstream G550 and
Airbus A350 instrument panels as current state-of-
the-art production aircraft. Additions from this
baseline were made to accommodate CAAT surface
and airborne traffic and route awareness.
Primary Flight Display
The PFD included an ATC message area
(CPDLC message area; Figure 2) on the outboard
third of the display unit showing incoming and
outgoing ATC data-link communications in textual
format. Incoming messages were color-coded
green while outgoing messages were white. All
messages were time-stamped. The captain’s
inboard display unit showed navigation and EICAS
displays.
Figure 2. Primary Flight Display
Navigation Display
The first officer’s inboard display was a full-
screen moving map navigation display with high
airport surface detail. Unlike today’s equipage,
surface and airborne traffic icons were included to
simulate an Automatic Dependent Surveillance –
Broadcast (ADS-B)-In environment. This display
automatically transitioned to the surface map
display (described below) after landing, when the
ground speed was less than 80 kt.
Electronic Flight Bag Display
The EFB was used as a flight crew’s interface
for ATC data-link communications, approach chart,
and airport diagram chart references. The CPDLC
functionality was modeled after existing
commercial aircraft vendor interfaces.
Surface Map Display
The surface map display (Figure 3) was an
enhanced version of the track-up navigation
display. The surface map was automatically
displayed on the ND during the landing rollout or it
could also be manually selected at any time.
Traffic locations were shown on the map. The
design largely reflects current RTCA Special
Committee (SC)-183 working group findings with
regard to element shape and color assignments, and
was designed for strategic use for surface
operations. For instance, the traffic icons were
displayed as medium tan colored chevrons when on
the surface and cyan when airborne. The own-ship
icon was a large white chevron, and the cleared taxi
route was shown in magenta.
A list of aircraft position and associated state
data was shown on the right side of the display.
This traffic list was sorted by proximity to own-ship
with the closest traffic listed first. A cursor control
device could be used to select specific traffic in the
list (magenta box indicated selected traffic) which
then displayed additional details of the selected
traffic (lower right of Figure 3). Traffic details
included: type, flight ID, speed, heading, ATC
assigned route (intent), and the range / bearing from
own-ship position. The own-ship’s assigned taxi
route was displayed on the lower center of the
display as a text string, and current position along
that route was highlighted in magenta. The EPs had
the capability to change the scale of the surface map
as desired with the lowest setting of 0.5 nm.
Traffic conflict indications and alerts were
displayed on the surface map and are described in
detail below.
Figure 3. Surface Map Display
Flight Deck Traffic Indications and Alerts
The concepts for traffic indications and alerts
were based on RTCA SC-186 Working Group
(WG)-1. This sub-committee is developing an
application description for flight deck-based
indication and alerting of actual or potential traffic
conflicts in the runway environment. The
application description was not finalized as this
study was planned; therefore, the definition of
indications as specified in a draft version of the
document [7] was utilized.
Traffic Indications
Indications are intended to identify to the flight
crew a normal operational condition that could
become a runway safety hazard. Two types of
indications are defined.
Secondary indications (SI) are provided if
there could be a potential collision hazard in the
immediate future. SIs are intended to increase the
flight crews’ situation awareness about relevant
traffic that could affect runway safety. If
appropriately cleared, the flight crew may proceed
with the runway operation.
A SI was indicated on the surface map by an
enlarged traffic symbol for the relevant traffic and
an identification tag that showed flight ID and
ground speed in knots. A status message was also
displayed in white text that indicated the relative
location of the traffic, e.g., “Traffic Approaching
22L”. In the event the traffic symbol was not
displayed on the surface map due to the current map
scale setting, an off-scale symbol was pegged on
the edge of the display in the direction of the traffic.
Primary indications (PI) are provided if the
own-ship’s current runway or the runway that own-
ship is immediately heading toward is not usable for
entering, takeoff, or landing. A collision hazard
would result if own-ship were to use that runway.
Before proceeding with crossing, entering, taxi,
take-off, or landing on a runway, the crew should
ensure that they have the appropriate clearance and
that the indicated traffic is no factor.
A PI was indicated on the surface map (Figure
4) in the same manner as a SI with the addition of a
blue and white dashed line around the relevant
runway.
Conflict Alerts
Alerts are intended to attract the attention of
the flight crew to non-normal traffic conditions and
to facilitate timely response to avoid a collision. A
two-level alerting scheme is employed.
Caution alerts are generated for conditions that
require immediate flight crew awareness and
subsequent flight crew response.
A caution alert was indicated on the surface
map (Figure 5) by an enlarged yellow traffic
symbol surrounded by a yellow circle for the
Figure 4. Surface Map showing Primary
Indication
Figure 5. Surface Map showing Caution Alert
relevant traffic; an identification tag that showed
flight ID, ground speed in knots, and distance
between the own-ship and traffic in nautical miles
(nm); and a yellow line around the relevant runway,
if applicable. An alert message (shown at the
bottom of Figure 5) was displayed in yellow text
and was annunciated in the flight deck. The alert
message included the relative location of the traffic.
An off-scale symbol was displayed if the traffic was
outside of the map viewing area due to the selected
map scale.
Warning alerts are generated for conditions
that require immediate flight crew awareness and
immediate flight crew response.
A warning alert was indicated in the same
manner as for a caution alert, except the warning
was associated with the color red and a square was
used to surround the traffic symbol (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Surface Map showing Warning Alert
Conflict Detection
Two methods of conflict detection were
evaluated during the simulation study.
The Airport Traffic Collision Avoidance
Monitor (ATCAM) detects potential traffic
conflicts at low altitudes near the airport, on the
runway, and during taxi and ramp operations for
multiple classes of aircraft and surface vehicles.
ATCAM currently generates caution and warning
alerts without resolutions.
ATCAM is comprised of three separate
aircraft-based algorithms that rely on target state
information that can be obtained from various
sources such as ADS-B or Traffic Information
Service-Broadcast (TIS-B).
1. The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) is
designed to detect and alert for runway conflicts.
RSM monitors own-ship and traffic located in a
three-dimensional virtual zone around the relevant
runway. The operational state of own-ship and
traffic, positions within the runway zone, and
separation and closure rate are used to determine
whether an alert will be generated. RSM is
described in detail in [8].
2. The Low Altitude Conflict Monitor
(LACM) is designed to detect and alert for air-to-air
conflicts near the airport at altitudes below 1000 ft
to not conflict with the Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS). LCAM computes
closing speed, time to closest point of approach,
time to co-altitude, and other data between own-
ship and approaching aircraft to determine if criteria
and thresholds are met for issuing alerts, similar to
the TCAS approach.
3. The Taxi Conflict Monitor (TCM) is
designed to detect and alert for ground taxi conflicts
anywhere in the airport movement and ramp areas.
The TCM initial design is similar to that of LACM
and computes distances between own-ship and
traffic, closing speeds, time to closest point of
approach and utilizes other parameters for alert
criteria.
The three are algorithms independent but are
integrated and share data to increase the probability
of detection for all possible conflicts during airport
operations. RSM has been through extensive
testing [3, 4, 5, 6], however, LACM and TCM are
in the initial development stage. Green, et. al. [9]
provides a detailed description of ATCAM
including initial alerting criteria.
The second incursion detection method was
based on implementation examples generated as
part of the application description being developed
by RTCA SC-186 WG-1. As mentioned above, the
application description was not finalized as this
study was planned; therefore, examples specified in
a draft version of the document [7] were utilized. A
CD&R algorithm was not developed but scenarios
were set-up and indications and alerts were
triggered based on the RTCA implementation
examples. In general, the RTCA committee is
recommending that caution alerts occur 16 to 35
seconds prior to a conflict and warning alerts occur
15 seconds or less prior to a conflict.
Test Method
Data collection occurred for several different
scenarios and test conditions as described below.
Test Scenarios
Runway, taxi, and low altitude air-to-air
conflict scenarios were evaluated. If a warning
alert was issued, the EP was trained to abort during
departure, go-around on approach, and stop during
taxi. The EP was not required to take action when
an indication or caution alert was issued. Stationary
traffic was positioned at various locations on the
airport.
Every effort was made to produce similar
timing for the scenarios; however, a certain amount
of variability was naturally introduced due to the
maneuvering conducted by the EP (i.e., deceleration
rate, taxi speed, etc.).
ship was 900 ft from Runway 10, the traffic began
its departure.
Runway Scenario - Arrival / take-off hold
This scenario tested the incursion situation
where an aircraft was in position and holding for
departure clearance while another aircraft was
approaching the same runway for a landing. The
own-ship was approaching Runway 10, 4 nm from
the threshold at 1330 ft above field level (AFL) and
at an indicated airspeed of 138 kt. The EP was
instructed to land. The traffic was initially at the
Runway 10 hold line nearest to the runway
threshold. The traffic taxied into position on the
active runway at the start of the simulation run and
held in that location.
Runway Scenario - Take-off hold / arrival
This scenario again tested the situation where
one aircraft was in position and holding for
departure clearance while another aircraft was
approaching the same runway for a landing. In this
instance, however, the traffic was approaching
Runway 14R, 5 nm from the threshold at 1650 ft
AFL and at an indicated airspeed of 138 kt. Own-
ship was initially located at the Runway 14R hold
line nearest to the runway threshold. The EP was
cleared into position on the active runway at the
start of the simulation run. The EP held in that
location awaiting departure clearance.
Runway Scenario – Departure / taxi
This scenario tested the incursion situation
where an aircraft is on departure and another
aircraft crosses the runway in front of departing
traffic. Own-ship was in position and holding on
Runway 10 awaiting departure. The traffic was
holding on Taxiway F at Runway 10. The EP was
cleared for departure. Once the EP initiated
departure (power lever angle > 70º) the traffic
crossed the runway.
Runway Scenario - Taxi / departure
This scenario again tested the situation where
an aircraft is on departure and another aircraft
crosses the runway in front of departing traffic. In
this instance, however, own-ship was initially on
Taxiway T12 as if just exited from Runway 14R.
The traffic was located in position and holding on
Runway 10 for departure. The EP taxied at 15 kt
and was cleared to taxi to Concourse H via T12, T,
F and cleared to cross Runway 10. When the own-
Runway Scenario - Arrival / arrival same
runway
In this scenario, own-ship was approaching
Runway 28, initially 4nm from the threshold at
1330 ft AFL and at an indicated airspeed of 138 kt.
Another aircraft was approaching Runway 28 ahead
of own-ship, initially 1 nm from the threshold at
370 ft AFL and an indicated airspeed of 138 kt.
The traffic landed and was slow to exit the runway.
Taxi Scenario – Exiting runway / taxi traffic
This scenario tests the situation where an
aircraft exits the runway and conflicts with traffic
on a parallel taxiway. Own-ship had just touched
down on Runway 10 and was cleared to taxi to
Concourse K via M6, D, A17. Traffic was taxiing
on Taxiway M toward Runway 22L. The taxi
traffic conflicts with own-ship as the EP exited the
runway at M6.
Taxi Scenario – Traffic ahead
This scenario tests the situation where an
aircraft exhibits excessive closure on traffic from
behind. Own-ship was taxiing on Taxiway T
toward Runway 14R at a ground speed of 25 kt.
The traffic was also taxiing on Taxiway T toward
Runway 14R ahead of the own-ship at a ground
speed of 15 kt.
Taxi Scenario – Traffic behind
This scenario also tests the situation where an
aircraft closes on traffic from behind. In this
instance, the own-ship was taxiing on Taxiway T
toward Runway 14R at a ground speed of 15kt.
Traffic was taxiing on Taxiway T toward Runway
14R behind own-ship at a ground speed of 20 kt.
Taxi Scenario – Taxi in ramp
This scenario tests the situation where two
aircraft conflict in the ramp area. Own-ship was
cleared to taxi to Runway 28 from Concourse G via
F, M, M7. Traffic was taxiing from Concourse H
via Taxiway F. A conflict occurred near the
entrance to Taxiway F.
Taxi Scenario – Traffic head-on
This scenario tests the situation where two
aircraft conflict head-on on a taxiway. Own-ship
had just touched down on Runway 28 and had been
cleared to taxi to Concourse E via T, A9. Traffic
was taxiing on Taxiway T toward Runway 28. A
conflict occurred on Taxiway T between Taxiways
T 10 and M.
Low Altitude Air-to-air Scenario – Arrival /
crossing traffic
This scenario tests the situation where an
aircraft in on final approach and traffic crosses its
path. Own-ship was on approach to Runway 14R, 2
nm from the threshold at 700 ft AFL and at an
indicated airspeed of 138 kt. Traffic was traveling
at heading 050, 1 nm back and 1 nm right of
Runway 14R threshold at an indicated airspeed of
138 kt. As own-ship approached the runway, the
traffic crossed own-ship’s path.
Evaluation Pilots
Twenty-four pilots served as participants for
the research, representing twelve flight crews. Each
crew flew for a major U.S. air carrier and was
paired by airline to ensure crew coordination and
cohesion with regard to terminal and surface
operational procedures. The Captains had an
average of over 14,000 flight hours with 19 years of
commercial flying experience. The first officers
had an average of over 10,000 flight hours with 13
years of commercial experience. All pilots were
required to have “glass cockpit” experience. The
Captain was the designated pilot flying throughout
all the trials and the First Officer served as the
monitoring pilot (pilot-not-flying). The flight crews
were asked to maintain good crew resource
management and comply with company specific
procedures.
Test Matrix
This study evaluated the indication and alert
timeliness based on ATCAM and RTCA alerting
criteria during runway, taxi, and low altitude air-to-
air conflicts. The effectiveness of indications and
alerts were also evaluated through EP ratings.
Each EP evaluated the runway conflict
scenarios three times per scenario. The EPs
expected a conflict event but were not aware of the
exact type of conflict prior to the first run.
On the first run, the EPs were shown alerts
using the ATCAM algorithm as the alert source.
Indications were not shown. On the second run, the
EPs were shown indications and alerts based on
ATCAM criteria. This allowed the EPSs to
evaluate the effectiveness of indications. On the
third run, the EPs were shown indications and alerts
based on RTCA criteria. This allowed the EPs to
evaluate ATCAM criteria versus RTCA criteria.
The runway conflict scenarios were grouped
together and given in different order by flight crew.
The EPs then evaluated the taxi and low altitude
air-to-air scenarios one time each in random order
per flight crew. It should be noted that during the
test runs, the EPs were asked to continue the
maneuver until the warning alert was received for
evaluation purposes. All test runs were conducted
in VMC conditions (3 nm visibility and 1000 ft
ceiling) without winds. Pilot reaction to conflict
events was not evaluated in this study.
Procedure
Each EP participated in a briefing and training
session prior to data collection. The EP was trained
on the conflict alerting concept using scenarios
different from those used during data collection.
Before each run, the pilots were briefed on the run
conditions (approach, departure, or taxi), alerting
system selected (ATCAM or RTCA), and displays
available (alerts only or indications and alerts).
Post-run, post-block, and post-test questionnaires
were administered. Audio, video, and digital data
were also recorded.
Results
A summary of quantitative and qualitative
results is presented. All test runs included conflict
events. All data is referenced from the center of
gravity (CG) of the aircraft.
Results by Scenario
Each flight crew conducted 24 test runs (288
total). The results are presented by scenario.
The timeliness of indications and alerts were
rated on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being “too early”
and 10 being “too late”. The usefulness of the
alerts were rated on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being
“completely useless” and 10 being “completely
useful”. Ratings for most other queries were based
on a 10 point scale with 1 equivalent to “strongly
disagree” and 10 being “strongly agree”.
Indications and RTCA alerting were only evaluated
for runway conflict scenarios.
Runway Scenario - Arrival / take-off hold
results
For this approach scenario, a SI was not
displayed. During 24 test runs (48 EP ratings), only
12 EPs (25 percent) thought that a SI was not
displayed, 30 EPs (62.5 percent) indicated a SI was
displayed, and 6 EPs (12.5 percent) did not know if
a SI was shown.
A PI was displayed. Of 48 EP ratings, 43 EPs
(89.6 percent) indicated a PI was displayed, 1 EP
(2.1 percent) indicated a PI was not displayed, and
4 EPs (8.3 percent) did not know. The PI was
reported to occur in a timely manner (Table 1).
Indications were deemed helpful in
determining critical runway safety information
(mean 8.2, standard deviation (SD) 1.6), helpful in
determining the location and movement of traffic
that was relevant to the safety of the own-ship
(mean 8.4, SD 1.7), and beneficial in this situation
(mean 8.6, SD 1.7).
The ATCAM caution alert and RTCA caution
alert occurred at approximately the same point
which was reported as being timely (Table 1).
However, the ATCAM warning alert occurred
earlier and was rated as being more timely than the
RTCA warning alert for this scenario.
Of 24 EP ratings, 19 EPs (79 percent)
indicated that the ATCAM alerting provided the
greatest amount of conflict prevention awareness,
no EPs indicated RTCA, and 5 EPs (21 percent)
indicated both methods of alerting were equivalent.
Of 24 EP ratings, 18 EPs (75 percent) preferred the
indication and ATCAM alerting combination for
this conflict situation, 2 EPs (8 percent) preferred
indications and RTCA alerting, and 4 EPs (17
percent) indicated both methods were equivalent.
Runway Scenario - Take-off hold / arrival
results
A SI was displayed for this scenario and
reported to occur in a timely manner (Table 2).
During 24 test runs (48 EP ratings) 46 EPs (95.8
percent) indicated a SI was displayed, 2 EPs (4.2
percent) did not know if a SI was displayed, and
none of the EPs indicated a SI was not displayed.
A PI was not displayed. Of 48 EP ratings,
only 19 EPS (39.6 percent) indicated a PI was not
displayed, 22 EPs (45.8 percent) indicated a PI was
displayed, and 7 EPs (14.6 percent) did not know.
Indications were deemed helpful in
determining critical runway safety information
(mean 7.7, SD 1.7), helpful in determining the
location and movement of traffic that was relevant
to the safety of the own-ship (mean 7.5, SD 1.4),
and beneficial in this situation (mean 8.5, SD 1.4).
Table 1. Indication and Alert Data for Arrival / Take-off Hold Runway Scenario
Type Distance to
traffic (nm)
Time to traffic
(seconds)
AFL (feet) Timeliness
(mean / SD)
Usefulness
(mean / SD)
PI 3.0 not available 950 5.1 / 1.1 7.3 / 2.1
ATCAM caution 1.4 35 490 5.8 / 1.1 7.5 / 2.2
ATCAM warning 1.0 26 325 6.1 / 1.5 8.5 / 1.6
RTCA caution 1.4 35 418 6.5 / 1.4 7.8 / 1.6
RTCA warning 0.6 15 183 8.6 /. 1.3 6.9 / 2.5
Table 2. Indication and Alert Data for Take-off Hold / Arrival Runway Scenario
Type Distance to
traffic (nm)
Time to conflict
(seconds)
Timeliness
(mean / SD)
Usefulness
(mean / SD)
SI 3.0 not available 5.7 / 1.4 7.6 / 2.0
ATCAM caution 2.2 55 5.8 / 1.3 7.3 / 2.4
ATCAM warning 1.2 29 6.7 / 1.6 6.6 / 3.0
RTCA caution 1.4 35 6.5 / 1.7 6.8 / 2.8
RTCA warning 0.6 15 7.9 / 1.6 6.5 / 3.4
Table 3. Indication and Alert Data for Departure Taxi Runway Scenario
Type Distance to
traffic (nm)
Time to conflict
(seconds)
Ground
Speed (kt)
Timeliness
(mean / SD)
Usefulness
(mean / SD)
PI 0.9 not applicable 0 5.5 / 1.0 7.2 / 2.2
ATCAM warning 0.9 37 7 5.5 / 1.6 8.1 / 2.3
RTCA warning 0.8 24 41 7.5 / 1.6 6.0 / 3.0
The ATCAM caution and warning alert were
rated as being slightly more timely than the RTCA
caution and warning alert (Table 2); however, both
were rated as occurring somewhat late. In this
situation, the EPs indicated that there was not really
any action to take other than calling ATC or the
conflict traffic.
Of 23 EP ratings, 14 EPs (61 percent)
indicated that the ATCAM alerting provided the
greatest amount of conflict prevention awareness, 2
EPs (9 percent) indicated RTCA, and 7 EPs (30
percent) indicated both methods of alerting were
equivalent. Of 24 EP ratings, 16 EPs (67 percent)
preferred the indication and ATCAM alerting
combination for this conflict situation, 3 EPs (12
percent) preferred indications and RTCA alerting,
and 5 EPs (21 percent) indicated both methods were
equivalent.
Runway Scenario - Departure / taxi results
A SI was not displayed for this scenario.
During 24 test runs (48 EP ratings), 29 EPs (60.4
percent) were aware that a SI was not displayed, 5
EPs (10.4 percent) indicated a SI was displayed and
14 EPs (29.2 percent) did not know.
A PI was displayed when the own-ship was
stationary and the traffic crossed the hold line
(Table 3). Of 48 EP ratings, 29 EPs (60.4 percent)
indicated a PI was displayed, 10 EPs (20.8 percent)
indicated a PI was not displayed, and 9 EPs (18.8
percent) did not know. The PI was indicated to
occur in a timely manner.
Indications were deemed helpful in
determining critical runway safety information
(mean 7.6, SD 2.4), helpful in determining the
location and movement of traffic that was relevant
to the safety of the own-ship (mean 7.2, SD 2.3),
and beneficial in this situation (mean 7.4, SD 2.7).
A caution alert was not generated for this
scenario. For the ATCAM alerting test runs, out of
24 EP ratings, 19 EPs (79.2 percent) indicated a
caution alert was not generated, 2 EPs (8.3 percent)
indicated a caution alert did occur, and 3 EPs (12.5
percent) did not know. For the RTCA alerting test
runs, only 1 EP (4.2 percent) indicated a caution
alert was displayed, the other 23 EPs (95.8 percent)
indicated a caution alert was not displayed.
The ATCAM warning alert occurred much
earlier and in a more timely manner (Table 3) than
the RTCA warning alert. Due to the criteria
specified for display of the RTCA warning alert
(own-ship departing (> 40 kt) and traffic crossed
hold line), the alert was only displayed during three
test runs.
Of 24 EP ratings, 20 EPs (83.3 percent)
indicated that the ATCAM alerting provided the
greatest amount of conflict prevention awareness,
no EPs indicated RTCA, and 4 EPs (16.7 percent)
indicated both methods of alerting were equivalent.
Of 23 EP ratings, 19 EPs (82.6 percent) preferred
the indication and ATCAM alerting combination
for this conflict situation, 2 EPs (8.7 percent)
preferred indications and RTCA alerting, and 2 EPs
(8.7 percent) indicated both methods were
equivalent.
Runway Scenario - Taxi / departure results
ATCAM is designed to provide early warning
of an impending runway conflict during taxi, based
on the aircraft taxi speed. If the own-ship is
traveling 8 kts or greater and is not slowing down,
the alert will be generated before the aircraft
reaches the hold line, providing sufficient distance
to stop before crossing the hold line. As the taxi
speed increases, the alert is generated when the
own-ship is a farther distance from the hold line.
When the own-ship is traveling less than 8 kt, the
alert is not generated until after the own-ship
crosses the hold line. The 8 kt threshold was used
to prevent false or nuisance alerts as the own-ship
taxis toward a hold line.
For this scenario, it is important to note that
the distance from the runway centerline to the
runway edge is 75 ft, the distance from the runway
edge to the hold line is 290 ft, and the distance from
the own-ship CG to the nose is 72.8 ft. The EP was
asked to taxi the aircraft at 15 kt. A SI was
displayed for this scenario in a timely manner
(Table 4). Of 48 EP ratings, only 23 EPs (47.9
percent) were aware that a SI was displayed, 16 EPs
(33.3 percent) indicated a SI was not displayed and
9 EPs (18.8 percent) did not know.
A PI was displayed if the traffic was departing
(> 40 kt) and the own-ship had not crossed the hold
line. During the ATCAM alerting test runs, a PI
was only displayed before the caution alert on 6 of
the 12 runs. This was due to the fact the ATCAM
generated alerts is a predictive manner and the
caution alert occurred before the criteria was met
for the PI. Of 24 EP ratings, only 9 EPs (37.5
percent) identified the display of the PI correctly for
these test runs. During the RTCA alerting test runs,
a PI was displayed on 11 of 12 runs. Of 24 EP
ratings, 18 EPs (75 percent) identified the display of
the PI correctly for these runs. The PI was rated as
occurring somewhat late (Table 4).
Indications were deemed helpful in
determining critical runway safety information
(mean 7.4, SD 1.8), helpful in determining the
location and movement of traffic that was relevant
to the safety of the own-ship (mean 7.8, SD 1.6),
and beneficial in this situation (mean 8.0, SD 2.3).
A caution alert was not generated for this
scenario. For the ATCAM alerting test runs (24 EP
ratings), 17 EPs (70.8 percent) indicated a caution
alert was not generated, 3 EPs (12.5 percent)
indicated a caution alert did occur, and 4 EPs (16.7
percent) did not know. For the RTCA alerting test
runs (24 EP ratings), 17 EPs (70.8 percent)
indicated a caution alert was not displayed, 1 EP
(4.2 percent) indicated a caution alert was
displayed, and 6 EPs (25 percent) did not know.
The ATCAM warning alerts were rated as
occurring in a more timely manner than the RTCA
alerts (Table 4). Due to the predictive alerting, the
ATCAM warning alert occurred prior to reaching
the hold line. The RTCA warning alert was not
displayed until the own-ship had crossed the hold
line and the traffic was departing (> 40 kt) which
the EPs indicated was too late.
Of 24 EP ratings, 19 EPs (79 percent)
indicated that the ATCAM alerting provided the
greatest amount of conflict prevention awareness, 1
EP (4 percent) indicated RTCA, and 4 EPs (21
percent) indicated both methods of alerting were
equivalent. Of 24 EP ratings, 18 EPs (75 percent)
preferred the indication and ATCAM alerting
combination for this conflict situation, 2 EPs (8
percent) preferred indications and RTCA alerting,
and 4 EPs (17 percent) indicated both methods were
equivalent.
Runway Scenario - Arrival / arrival same
runway results
For this approach scenario, a SI was not
displayed. During 24 test runs (48 EP ratings), only
10 EPS (20.8 percent) thought that a SI was not
displayed, 31 EPs (64.6 percent) indicated a SI was
displayed, and 7 EPs (14.6 percent) did not know if
a SI was shown.
A PI was displayed. Of 48 EP ratings, 44 EPs
(91.7 percent) indicated a PI was displayed, 2 EPs
(4.2 percent) indicated a PI was not displayed, and
2 EPs (4.2 percent) did not know. The PI was
indicated to occur in a timely manner (Table 5).
Table 4. Indication and Alert Data for Taxi / Departure Runway Scenario
Type Distance from
hold line (feet)
Timeliness
(mean / SD)
Usefulness
(mean / SD)
SI 630 5.3 / 1.0 7.2 / 2.3
PI 113 6.6 / 1.1 6.0 / 2.3
ATCAM warning 111 6.5 / 1.3 7.8 / 2.2
RTCA warning -5 8.6 / 1.4 5.6 / 3.1
Table 5. Indication and Alert Data for Arrival / Arrival Same Runway Scenario
Type Distance to
traffic (nm)
Time to traffic
(seconds)
AFL (feet) Timeliness
(mean / SD)
Usefulness
(mean / SD)
PI 3.0 not available 1016 5.1 / 1.2 7.3 / 1.9
ATCAM caution 2.0 51 463 5.4 / 0.5 8.3 / 1.4
ATCAM warning 1.8 47 383 4.9 / 1.5 8.0 / 1.7
RTCA caution 2.2 55 516 5.7 / 1.0 7.9 / 1.5
RTCA warning 1.5 39 218 6.7 / 1.8 7.7 / 2.0
Indications were deemed helpful in
determining critical runway safety information
(mean 8.2, SD 1.2), helpful in determining the
location and movement of traffic that was relevant
to the safety of the own-ship (mean 8.3, SD 1.4),
and beneficial in this situation (mean 8.6, SD 1.5).
The ATCAM and RTCA caution alert
occurred at approximately the same point which
was reported as being timely (Table 5). The
ATCAM warning alert occurred slightly earlier and
was rated as being slightly more timely than the
RTCA warning alert.
Of 24 EP ratings, 12 EPs (50 percent)
indicated that the ATCAM alerting provided the
greatest amount of conflict prevention awareness, 7
EPs (29 percent) indicated RTCA, and 5 EPs (21
percent) indicated both methods of alerting were
equivalent. Of 24 EP ratings, 11 EPs (46 percent)
preferred the indication and ATCAM alerting
combination for this conflict situation, 8 EPs (33
percent) preferred indications and RTCA alerting,
and 5 EPs (21 percent) indicated both methods were
equivalent.
Taxi Scenario - Exiting runway / taxi traffic
results
The timing for this scenario was somewhat
inconsistent due to the manner in which the EP
decelerated the aircraft. As a result, the ATCAM
caution alert was only generated before a warning
alert on 7 out of 12 test runs. Both the ATCAM
caution and warning alerts were indicated to occur
somewhat late (Table 6).
Taxi Scenario - Traffic ahead results
For this scenario, the EP was asked to taxi at
25 kt in order to over-come the traffic taxiing ahead
at 15 kt. The ATCAM warning alert was rated as
being somewhat late (Table 6).
Taxi Scenario - Traffic behind results
For this scenario, the EP was asked to taxi at
10 kt to 15 kt so the traffic taxiing behind the own-
ship at 20 kt would gain on own-ship. The
ATCAM warning alert was rated as being
somewhat late (Table 6).
Taxi Scenario - Taxi in ramp results
The timing for this scenario was somewhat
inconsistent due to the speed in which the EP taxied
the aircraft. As a result, the test run had to be
repeated for some crews because the alert was not
generated on the first attempt. The ATCAM
warning alert was rated as being somewhat late
(Table 6).
Taxi Scenario - Traffic head-on results
When the ATCAM warning alert occurred
(Table 6), there was no place to exit the taxiway
before reaching the traffic. From discussions, some
pilots indicated they would prefer the alert to occur
at a point when there was still the opportunity to
exit the taxiway before reaching the traffic. At
present, ATCAM cannot alert based on turn
locations because taxiway data is not utilized.
Low Altitude Air-to-air Scenario - Arrival /
crossing traffic results
The ATCAM caution alert occurred as soon as
this scenario began due to the initial location of the
conflict traffic; therefore, a true indication of when
the caution alert would be generated cannot be
determined. The ATCAM warning alert was rated
as occurring somewhat late (Table 7).
Qualitative
Post-run, post-block, and post-test
questionnaires were administered when required.
Ratings for most of the questions were given on a
scale of 1 (“strongly disagree”, “completely
useless”) to 10 (“strongly agree”, “completely
Table 6. Alert Data for Taxi Scenarios
Type Distance (feet) Time (seconds) Timeliness
(mean / SD)
Usefulness
(mean / SD)
Taxi Scenario exiting runway / taxi traffic results (distance and time to impact reported)
ATCAM caution 434 10 7.1 / 1.5 6.9 / 2.3
ATCAM warning 257 5 7.8 / 1.6 6.4 / 2.8
Taxi Scenario traffic ahead results (distance and time to traffic reported)
ATCAM caution 378 15 6.0 / 1.5 7.3 / 2.0
ATCAM warning 181 7 6.9 / 1.8 7.3 / 2.4
Taxi Scenario traffic behind results (distance and time to traffic reported)
ATCAM caution 208 15 6.4 / 1.6 6.0 / 2.5
ATCAM warning 102 7 7.3 / 1.5 6.1 / 2.4
Taxi Scenario taxi inramp results (distance from hold line reported)
ATCAM caution 334 15 5.6 / 1.1 7.5 / 1.8
ATCAM warning 215 9 7.3 / 1.0 7.6 / 1.7
Taxi Scenario traffic head-on results (distance and time to impact reported)
ATCAM caution 375 10 6.7 / 1.5 6.6 / 2.5
ATCAM warning 213 6 7.6 / 1.5 6.0 / 3.2
Table 7. Alert Data for Arrival / Crossing Traffic Low Altitude Air-to-air Scenario
Type Distance
(feet)
Time
(seconds)
AFL (feet) Timeliness
(mean / SD)
Usefulness
(mean / SD)
ATCAM caution 1.0 nm 25 642 6.7 / 1.6 7.5 / 1.6
ATCAM warning 0.8 nm 19 576 7.0 / 1.4 7.5 / 2.2
useful”). The post-test questionnaire was given to
the EPs to fill out at their leisure. Twenty-one
questionnaires were returned. In general, the EPs
indicated they felt slightly safer when indications
and alerts were provided (mean 8.6, SD 0.9) than
when alerts alone were provided (mean 7.4, SD
1.3).
Indications
Indications were found to be helpful in
determining critical runway safety information
(mean 8.0, SD 1.4) and in determining the location
and movement of traffic that was relevant to the
safety of the own-ship (mean 8.2, SD 1.7). Of 21
EP ratings, 20 EPs (95.2 percent) responded that
indications were desired for runway and taxi
operations and 19 EPs (90.5 percent) responded that
indications were desired for low altitude air-to-air
operations. The enlarged chevron (mean 7.9, SD
2.0) and the indicated runway (mean 7.5, SD 2.3)
were rated as being the most useful for determining
relevant traffic. During the testing, it was observed
that there was some confusion over the terms SI and
PI. This can be evidenced by the data reported
above on the EPs lack of awareness of the display
of a SI and PI. Primary usually implies initial,
however, in this case the SI was the initial
indication provided in many situations.
Alerts
Regarding alert display features, the auditory
alert (mean 9.2, SD 1.0) was rated as being most
useful, followed by the circle/square surrounding
the chevron (mean 8.2, SD 1.1), the indicated
runway (mean 7.8, SD 2.4), and the enlarged
chevron (mean 7.6, SD 1.8). Of 20 EP ratings, all
20 EPs (100 percent) responded that the audible
alert was most likely to bring a conflict situation to
their attention. During an alert, the distance
between the traffic and own-ship was displayed as
part of the traffic ID tag. Of 20 EP ratings, 12 EPs
(60 percent) indicated they used this information.
There was some discussion related to the method of
display. The text for the ID tag was somewhat
small and was sometimes difficult to see against the
surface map background, especially for the red text
associated with a warning. It was recommended to
perhaps highlight the traffic ID tag or display in
another location such as the text message area at the
bottom of the surface map. Of 24 EP ratings, 15
EPs (62.5 percent) wanted the distance displayed in
nautical miles and 9 EPs (37.5 percent) preferred a
combination display (above 1 nm use nautical
miles, below 1 nm use feet).
Post-experimental paired comparison
questionnaires were administered for pilots to
evaluate preferences for alerting phraseology for
selected conflict scenarios. An Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) was performed followed by a
Student-Newman Keuls (SNK) post-hoc test using a
0.05 significance level.
The EPs rated the phrase, “Traffic on 10” the
most significantly preferred alert phrase for the
runway conflict on arrival scenario. For the runway
conflict on departure scenario, the SNK revealed
two significant subsets with multiple alert phrases
not being significantly different in terms of
preferences. The most preferred choices were
“Runway Occupied”, “Runway Conflict”, and
“Traffic on 10”. It is important to note that “Traffic
on 10” was also preferred for runway conflict on
arrival suggesting it as the ideal candidate as alert
phrase for runway conflicts on departure and
arrival. When taxiing across a runway, the post-hoc
test revealed three unique subsets of grouping for
alert phrases. The top choices were both “Traffic
Departing 10” and “Runway Conflict”. To reflect
the results for runway incursion for departures and
arrivals described above, the data purports the best
choice to be “Traffic Departing 10” although it is
important to note that the ratings were based on a
specific conflict scenario.
The EPs also provided paired comparison
ratings for alert phrases during taxi conflicts. They
significantly rated the alert phrase, “Traffic
Converging from Left” for the traffic conflict from
the left scenario. For the head-on taxi conflict
scenario, the EPs uniquely rated “Traffic Ahead”,
as the top choice for the taxiway conflict scenario.
Taken together, these results evince that directional
information on taxiway conflict aircraft (e.g.,
“Traffic Ahead”) provides the best information to
the pilot and was most preferred. Experimental
research to confirm these ratings are needed to
validate these findings.
The low altitude air-to-air scenario involved an
aircraft that was on arrival during the same time
that other traffic was crossing on approach for
landing. The paired comparison procedure includes
a statistic that checks for internal consistency of
pilot responses to ensure that the pilot ratings were
reasonable across alert phrase preferences.
Unfortunately, the statistics demonstrated a
statistically significant dissociation with intra-pilot
response. Therefore, only descriptive analysis of
EP phrase preference was available for this scenario
(Table 8).
Table 8. Alert Phrase Preference for Low
Altitude Air-to-Air Scenario
No. of EP Phrase
6 Traffic Right and Below
6 Traffic Converging from Right
6 Traffic 2 O’ clock
3 Conflict
2 Traffic Converging
1 Traffic Converging Ahead
Directive Alerting
The EPs were queried whether directive alerts,
in which information is provided on how to resolve
the imminent conflict, were desired for runway,
taxi, and low altitude air-to-air operations. Of 24
EP ratings, Table 9 shows that directive alerts are
desired for low altitude air-to-air (19 EPs, 79.2
percent) and runway conflicts on approach (17 EPs,
70.8 percent). Approximately half of the EPs
indicated directive alerts were desired for runway
conflicts on departure and when taxiing across a
runway. Directive alerts were not desired for taxi
conflicts. Of 24 EP ratings, 19 EPs (79.2 percent)
would prefer the directive alert before the alert
message (e.g,. “Go around, Traffic on 10”), 4 EPs
(16.7 percent) would prefer the directive after the
alert message (e.g., “Traffic on 10, Go around”),
and 1 EP (4.2 percent) would prefer the directive
alone, without an alert message (e.g., “Go around”).
The preferred directive for the different operational
phases were: “go around” during approach, “abort”
during departure, “stop” during taxi, and “climb” or
“go around” during low altitude operations.
Table 9. Directive Alerting Preference by
Operation
Operation Yes No Don’t
Know
Runway conflict on approach 17 3 1
Runway conflict on departure 11 9 1
Runway conflict during taxi 10 10 1
Low altitude air-to-air conflict 19 2 0
Taxi conflict 6 11 4
Algorithm
Pilots provided qualitative ratings on the
efficacy of onset and latency of alerting for
ATCAM compared to the RTCA recommended
alerts. Pilots reported a significant preference for
the ATCAM algorithm for runway conflict
scenarios, except for the case when on approach
and following other approach traffic:
• Runway conflict on approach,
F(1,48) = 28.151, p < .001;
• Runway conflict while in position on runway,
F(1,48) = 14.240, p < .001;
• Runway conflict on departure,
F(1,48) = 15.534, p < .001;
• Runway conflict during taxi,
F(1,48) = 45.601, p < .001;
• Runway conflict on approach following traffic,
F(1,48) = 3.351, p < .074.
Pilots further rated the ATCAM algorithm to
be significantly better for conflict prevention
awareness on a binary preference comparison
ranking scale with a 10-point Likert qualitative
magnitude rating scale (0 = “no difference”; 5 =
“significant difference”; 10 = “highly significant
difference”).
• Runway conflict on Approach,
(Z = 2.637, df = 48, p < .001)
• Runway conflict while in position on runway,
(Z = 2.776, df = 48, p < .001)
• Runway conflict on departure,
(Z = 3.0625, df = 48, p < .001)
• Runway conflict during taxi,
(Z = 2.767, df = 48, p < .001)
• Runway conflict on approach following traffic,
(Z = 2.635, df = 48, p < .001)
Pilot preference for ATCAM for conflict
awareness was related to comparison ratings of the
timeliness of the alert on a 5-point Likert Scale (0 =
“at about the same time”; -2 = “much earlier”; +2 =
“much later”) in which the ATCAM algorithm was
found to be significantly earlier than the RTCA
recommended algorithm timing:
• Runway conflict on approach,
(Z = 1.938, df = 24, p < .001)
• Runway conflict while in position on runway,
(Z = 1.714, df = 24, p < .01)
• Runway conflict on departure,
(Z = 1.621, df = 24, p < .01)
• Runway conflict during taxi,
(Z = 1.655, df = 24, p < .01)
• Runway conflict on approach following traffic,
(Z = 1.793, df = 24, p < .01)
These results were confirmed by pilot
preference for a combination of ATCAM algorithm
with indications compared to RTCA recommended
alerting and indications:
• Runway conflict on approach,
(Z = 2.3 100, df = 24, p < .001);
• Runway conflict while in position and holding,
(Z = 1.980, df = 24, p < .001);
• Runway conflict on departure,
(Z = 2.415, df = 24, p < .00 1);
• Runway conflict during taxi,
(Z = 2.203, df = 24, p < .001);
• Runway conflict on approach following traffic,
(Z = 1.420, df = 24, p < .05).
Summary
An initial CAAT concept for the TMA was
evaluated in a simulation study. The purpose of the
study was to evaluate the initial concept for an
aircraft-based method of conflict detection and
resolution focusing on conflict detection algorithms
and alerting display concepts.
The results show that indications were found to
be helpful in determining runway safety
information and the location and movement of
relevant traffic. However, pilot responses indicated
that the descriptive terms used for indications (SI
and PI) were confusing. This terminology has since
been modified by RTCA SC-186 WG-1. The new
terminology will be used and evaluated for
usefulness in future research studies.
The auditory alert was rated as being most
salient and useful and most likely to bring the
conflict event to the pilot’s attention. The results
suggest that the method of display for the distance
between own-ship and traffic during an alert may
have limited the usefulness of the information due
to the presentation method. There was variability
across pilots on the actual alert phraseology that had
the highest efficacy for a specified scenario
although quantitative analyses allowed for
discrimination of choice for each scenario.
Modifications will be made to the alert displays to
reflect pilot feedback.
Pilot responses indicate directive alerts are
desired for both low altitude air-to-air and runway
operations but not for taxi operations. These results
will be further examined in upcoming simulation
research. Overall, the ATCAM alerting criteria and
RTCA criteria were found to be adequate for pilot
response to a runway conflict. However, pilots
significantly preferred the ATCAM alerting criteria
to the RTCA criteria in all tested runway conflict
scenarios and ATCAM was rated significantly
better for conflict prevention awareness. Overall,
pilots observed that the ATCAM alerted
significantly earlier providing substantially more
time to proactively avoid the conflict situation.
Future research will focus on optimizing the
ATCAM algorithm and alerting displays based on
the results of the current research and testing under
an expanded set of conflict scenarios. Near-term
NASA simulation research objectives involve
further evaluation of directive alerting for runway,
low altitude air-to-air, and taxi conflicts. The
experimental methodology planned will enable the
evaluation of pilot behavioral response to off-
nominal conflict events.
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